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NOTES
Basic Inc. v. Levinson: An Unwise Extension of
the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
For over a decade, federal courts have embraced the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory, which is based on the premise that investors in a publicly traded stock
rely on both the efficiency and the integrity of the stock market in making their
investment decisions. Acceptance of this theory has allowed plaintiffs in securi-
ties fraud actions to satisfy their burden of proving that they relied on a defend-
ant's fraudulent statements or acts when the plaintiffs were unable to prove
direct reliance. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson 1 the United States Supreme Court for
the first time upheld the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish a
rebuttable presumption of reliance in a securities fraud action brought under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5 promul-
gated thereunder.3
In Basic the Court held that the fraud-on-the-market theory could be used
by former shareholders of Basic, Inc., a publicly held corporation, to establish
the necessary reliance for a rule lOb-5 action.4 Individual members of the plain-
tiff shareholder class had sold their Basic shares over a period of time during
which Basic, through its agents, issued three statements publicly denying merger
negotiations with another corporation, Combustion Engineering. 5 When the
merger occured and Basic's share price rose, the shareholders who sold their
shares after the reports but before the merger sued Basic, claiming they were
defrauded by the company's denials of merger negotiations. 6 The Supreme
Court held that each individual plaintiff did not have to prove he directly relied
on the public denials, but instead the entire class of shareholders who sold their
stock could rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the shareholder relied on the integrity of the market price.7 Such
reliance, the Court concluded, would satisfy the requirements of rule lOb-5.8
This Note examines the history and purpose of reliance requirements for
rule lOb-5 actions and the implementation of the fraud-on-the-market theory to
satisfy those requirements in certain cases. The Note concludes that the
Supreme Court, in upholding the fraud-on-the-market theory as establishing a
rebuttable presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market, has failed to
1. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
4. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993.
5. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 742-43 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
For a discussion of the nature of the three statements and the circumstances under which each was
issued, see infra note 10.
6. Id. at 743.
7. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991-92.
8. Id. at 992.
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define the type of causation-transaction or loss-that is established by the pre-
sumption of reliance. By failing to expressly limit the plaintiff's use of the fraud-
on-the-market theory to satisfy the burden of proving transaction causation, the
Court in Basic left its opinion open to the interpretation that the plaintiff can
rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to satisfy his burden of proving actual
loss. Such an extension of the theory would act to shift the burden of proving
damages away from the plaintiff to the defendant who then would have the bur-
den of rebutting the plaintiff's alleged damages. A shift of the burden of proving
actual loss from the plaintiff is inapposite to the purpose of the fraud-on-the-
market theory as espoused in prior case law and the well-established rule in all
securities fraud cases that a plaintiff must prove his actual damages. The Court
needs to clarify the potential confusion in its position by limiting the holding of
Basic so that the fraud-on-the-market theory can be used only to establish trans-
action causation.
In December 1978 Basic, a chemical refractories manufacturer, publicly
agreed to merge with Combustion Engineering following a series of complex
negotiations that had begun in September 1976. 9 During the twenty-six-month
period between the beginning of negotiations and formal agreement, Basic issued
three public statements denying involvement in any merger negotiations that
would account for the heavy trading activity in its stock.' 0 After the merger
between Basic and Combustion was announced, former shareholders of Basic
who sold their stock prior to the merger announcement and after the first of the
denials brought suit against Basic and specified officers and directors of Basic,
alleging that the public denials artificially deflated the price of Basic stock and
violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the corre-
sponding SEC rule lOb-5."1
The district court applied a presumption of reliance on the integrity of the
market on the part of all plaintiff shareholders.' 2 In so doing, the court was able
to certify the former shareholders as a class for the purpose of a class action
pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 The district court
9. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 743.
10. Id. at 744. On October 19-20, 1977, after Basic and Combustion had been negotiating for
over a year, the trading volume of Basic shares rose from an average of 6,000 to 8,000 shares a day to
29,000 shares traded. On October 21 The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that in a public an-
nouncement from Basic, Basic's CEO, Max Muller, issued a statement which said in pertinent part
that the company knew of no reason for the stock's activity and that no negotiations were under way
with any company for a merger. Id.
On September 25, 1978, Basic stock had risen almost five points in the previous two days with a
trading volume between 28,500 and 31,900 shares. The normal trading activity in Basic at that time
was 2,000 to 8,000 per day. Id. at 745 n.3. At that time Basic's senior vice president, Matthew
Ludwig, issued another press release which stated that Basic was "unaware of any present or pend-
ing corporate development that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity and price
fluctuation in company shares." Id. at 745.
Finally, on October 12, 1978, in its "Nine Month Interim Report to Shareholders," Basic again
stated "we remain unaware of any present or pending developments which would account for the
high volume of trading and price fluctuations in recent months." Id.
* 11. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 742-43.
12. Id. at 749-50. The district court's opinion was not published.
13. For class certification, subsection (a) of rule 23 requires a showing of numerousness of
plaintiffs, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims, and fair and adequate protection of
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held that requiring each individual shareholder to prove direct reliance on the
misstatements would be "a barrier to class actions in rule 10b-5 cases."' 14 By
applying the presumption of reliance, the court left open only the common ques-
tion of whether or not the misstatement was material. 15 After certifying plain-
tiffs' class, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
and held as a matter of law that the statements denying the negotiations were
not material and therefore not misleading.16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district
court's class certification, agreeing with the district court's application of the
rebuttable presumption of reliance. 17 In upholding the class certification, the
court of appeals relied on the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance, which is
based on the premises that "in an efficient market, the price of a stock will reflect
all information available to the public,"' 18 and that "an individual relies on the
integrity of the market price when dealing in that stock."'19 The Sixth Circuit
set forth five requirements necessary to invoke the presumption of reliance based
on the fraud-on-the-market theory2° and held that the plaintiff class, having met
all the elements, had "established the threshold facts for proving their loss. ' '21
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 2 and vacated and re-
manded the case based on the court of appeals' decision on the materiality is-
the interests of the class. In addition to satisfying subsection (a), plaintiffs must also satisfy one of
three requirements set forth in 23(b). For purposes of the Basic discussion, the language in 23(b)
reads in pertinent part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if ... the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
14. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 750.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 749.
17. Id. at 749-51. Although upholding the class certification, the court of appeals reversed the
district court's summary judgment ruling on the issue of materiality. Id. at 749. A complete discus-
sion of what constitutes a material misrepresentation is beyond the scope of this Note; however, a
brief explanation of the standard of materiality in merger negotiations is helpful because materiality
is an essential requirement of the fraud-on-the-market theory. In Basic the Supreme Court expressly
adopted the standard of materiality the Court had previously set forth in T.S.C. Indus. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Court held that a statement is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it significant in making his investment decision.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988. Applying this standard to the merger negotiation context, the Court said
that each case must be decided on its specific facts to determine whether a denial or admission of
merger negotiations would be significant to the reasonable investor. Id. at 987-88.
18. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 750 (citing Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1143, 1154 & n.44 (1982)).
19. Id. (citing Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975)).
20. The court of appeals noted:
A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations, (2)
that the misrepresentations were material, (3) that the stock was traded in an efficient
market, (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonably relying investor to mis-
judge the value of the stock, and (5) that the plaintiff traded in the stock between the time
the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
Id. (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 751.
22. 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
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sue.23 The Court held, however, that the class was appropriately certified and
approved the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance.24
The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, stated that reliance was
a necessary element in rule lOb-5 causes of action to establish "the requisite
causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's in-
jury."'25 The Court held that although reliance was necessary, requiring direct
proof of reliance would have effectively prevented plaintiffs from proceeding
with the class action. 26 Thus, the Court approved the presumption of reliance
based on the fraud-on-the-market theory. The Court added that the presump-
tion was rebuttable, and if defendants could prove that an individual plaintiff did
not rely on the integrity of the market price or the market did not reflect the
misstatement, then that plaintiff could not rely on the presumption. 27
The dissent2 8 argued that it was inappropriate for the Court to embrace an
unproven economic theory that in effect ignores Congress' clear intent that reli-
ance be a necessary element in a rule 10b-5 action. 29 If the reliance requirement
is changed, the dissent argued, such a change should come from Congress and
not the Court. The dissent also argued that allowing plaintiffs to bring suit
based on misstatements they neither read nor heard undermined the full disclo-
sure policy of the federal securities laws. 30 Lastly, the dissent argued that even
if the fraud-on-the-market theory were a valid economic theory, the facts in Ba-
sic made it "an exceedingly poor candidate" in which to apply the theory. 3 1
23. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988.
24. Id. at 993.
25. Id. at 989.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 992; see infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
28. Justices White and O'Connor joined with the majority on the materiality issue, but dis-
sented in the fraud on the market holding. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ken-
nedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. The fact that the final vote was only
4-2 leaves open the possibility that a full Court in the future may reach a different conclusion.
29. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996-97 (White & O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent's argument is based upon the congressional decision to require reliance in § 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. Section 18 provides an express civil remedy for plaintiffs
defrauded by material misstatements found in documents filed with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1982). Rule lOb-5 does not provide an express right of action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988).
Courts, however, have consistently implied a private cause of action in 10b-5 cases, beginning with
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The dissent's argument
is that "Congress ... anticipated meaningful proof of 'reliance' before civil recovery [could] be had
under the Securities Act." Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997 (White & O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). This view has found acceptance with one legal commentator who wrote, "If the
implied remedy relaxes a requirement of the explicit remedy ... an unacceptable nullification of the
congressional scheme results." Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435, 466 (1984).
For a discussion of the acceptability of an implied right of action under rule lob-5 coexisting
with the express right of action under § 18, see Ross v. A.H. Robins, Co., 607 F.2d 545, 552-56 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
30. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997-98 (White & O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
31. Id. at 998-99 (White & O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent argued that the presumption of reliance is inappropriate when all the plaintiffs were sellers of
stock who sold their shares at a profit over a 14-month period. Id.
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Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowered the SEC to
create rules to protect the public against manipulative or deceptive conduct in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange. 32 In order to enforce its guidelines, the SEC promulgated
rule 10b-5, which states in relevant part, "It shall be unlawful for any person...
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact.., in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."'33
Decisions under rule lOb-5 have consistently required that the plaintiff
prove not only that the statement was material, as specifically mandated in the
statute, but also that the plaintiff relied on the misstatement. 34 Courts have
required proof of reliance in order to demonstrate the " 'causal link between the
misrepresentation or omission and the injuries suffered by the private plain-
tiff.' "'35 Proof of reliance was established by a plaintiff's showing that a defend-
ant's "misrepresentation [was] a substantial factor in determining the course of
conduct which result[ed] in [the plaintiff's] loss. ' '36
The reliance requirement became more difficult to establish when the 10b-5
cause of action was broadened in Securities Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur (TGS)37 to include fraudulent public statements made by corporations
outside of face-to-face transactions. In TGS the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that a press release issued by Texas Gulf Sulphur
that gave a "gloomy" mining forecast when in fact the company's mining test
results were highly favorable could constitute a violation of rule 10b-5. 3 8
Although the case involved a criminal suit brought by the SEC, the court of
appeals' decision that such publicly issued corporate statements could support
rule lob-5 liability laid the foundation for individual shareholders to bring lob-5
civil suits based on such corporate misstatements. 39
Shareholders' suits based on corporate misstatements often took the form of
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
34. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.) (noting that the authorities are
clear that reliance is a necessary requirement for civil suits brought under l0b-5), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (suggesting that "[w]ith
regard to the element of reliance, although there is dicta to the contrary, this element appears to be
indispensable to the [10b-5] cause of action.... [a]bsent proof of reliance there is no liability"), aff'd,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 767 (D.N.J. 1955) (holding
that a plaintiff who had not relied upon misrepresentation in newspapers could not base suit upon
same misrepresentations); see also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1765-66 (2d ed. 1961) ("It
is difficult not to think in terms of reliance as inherent in the very theory of the action.").
35. Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Dupey v. Dupey,
551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985).
36. List, 340 F.2d at 462 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938)).
37. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
38. Id. at 862-63. The court of appeals did not make a final determination as to whether or not
Texas Gulf Sulphur had violated 10b-5, but instead remanded to the district court the question of
whether the press release satisfied lOb-5's materiality requirements.
39. Following TGS, shareholders of Texas Gulf Sulphur successfully sued the corporation
under rule 10b-5, claiming that each shareholder sold his stock at a result of the same deceptive press
release which was the basis for the earlier criminal proceedings filed against Texas Gulf Sulphur by
the SEC. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971).
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class actions.40 The class action was an effective means of obtaining relief for
individual plaintiffs whose losses taken individually were "too 'small to justify
legal action but which [were] of significant size if taken as a group."'4'
The problem that the lOb-5 reliance requirement creates in a class action
suit is compounded by rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states that a class may be certified if "the questions of law and fact com-
mon to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting indi-
vidual members."'4 2 If each individual plaintiff were obligated to prove his
reliance on a corporate misstatement, individual questions concerning whether
each shareholder relied on the statement would predominate and rule 23(b)(3)
would not be satisfied.4 3 To circumvent both the practical and procedural diffi-
culties of establishing direct reliance in class actions, federal courts relaxed the
reliance requirement. 44 This relaxed reliance requirement, which manifests it-
self in the fraud-on-the-market theory, is best illustrated by two cases in which
courts held that plaintiffs need not prove direct reliance, but instead may rely on
the theory to prove causation. The courts, however, differed as to which type of
causation-loss or transaction-was provided by the plaintiff's use of the fraud-
on-the-market theory.
In Blackie v. Barrack45 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit dispensed with direct proof of reliance in a class action brought under
rule lOb-5. In Blackie plaintiffs, who bought stock in a publicly held corpora-
tion, claimed that manipulations of the company's finances artificially inflated
the value of the stock. The court of appeals, in upholding the district court's
class certification, stated that public policy supported allowing such class actions
because of the "substantial role that the deterrent effect.., plays in accomplish-
ing the objectives of the security laws."'46
The court held that to require each individual shareholder to prove reliance
would impose "an unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden." 47 Instead
of requiring direct reliance, the court examined the rationale behind the reliance
requirement and decided that causation could be established without reliance.
The court concluded, "[P]roof of reliance is adduced to demonstrate the causal
connection between the defendant's wrongdoing and the plaintiffs' loss. We
think causation is adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange con-
40. See Black, supra note 29, at 439.
41. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965). Professor Black has
noted, "Unless a class action could be maintained, investors with small losses effectively would be
precluded from redressing their injuries." Black, supra note 29, at 440.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see supra note 13.
43. See supra note 13.
44. The Supreme Court had previously dispensed with the requirement of direct reliance in
lOb-5 actions based on material omissions, concluding that the connection between a plaintiff's in-jury and the defendant's wrongful omission could be sufficiently established by proof of the material-
ity of the omission. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). In the
Court's view, compelling the plaintiff to prove how he would have acted but for the omission-how
he relied on the omission-was unnecessary. Id.
45. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
46. Id. at 903.
47. Id. at 907.
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text by proof of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, without
direct proof of reliance." 48
A Third Circuit case explained more thoroughly how the "causal connec-
tion" referred to in Blackie is established without proof of direct reliance. In
Peil v. Speiser 49 the purchasers of stock in a publicly held chemical corporation
brought suit against the corporation under rule lOb-5, alleging that misrepresen-
tations about the corporation's business prospects artificially inflated the value of
the corporation's stock. The court of appeals found that plaintiffs did not bear
the burden of proving reliance directly, but instead could rely on the fraud-on-
the-market theory. 50 The court explained:
The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the com-
pany and its business. Misleading statements will therefore defraud
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements. The misstatements may affect the price of the stock
and thus defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of
the stock's value. By artificially inflating the price of the stock, the
misrepresentations defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an in-
dication of the stock's value. The causal connection between the de-
fendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no
less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentation. 5 1
In Blackie the court spoke of reliance in terms of loss causation-the
"causal connection between the defendant's wrongdoing and the plaintiff's
loss. ' '52 The Peil court more accurately addressed transaction causation-the
connection between defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's purchase or sale of
stock. By explaining reliance in terms of loss causation and not transaction cau-
sation, the court in Blackie apparently failed to recognize that the plaintiff in a
lOb-5 action must prove not only that the defendant's misrepresentation induced
48. Id. at 906.
49. 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 1161.
51. Id. at 1160 (citation omitted). The court of appeals stated that the basis of the fraud on the
market theory is that "[t]he price of a company's stock is determined by the available public infor-
mation." Id. This "efficient market" theory maintains that "'security prices reflect all available
public information about the economy, about financial markets, and about the specific company
involved. Implied is that market prices of individual securities adjust very rapidly to new informa-
tion.' " In re L.T.V. Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (1980) (quoting J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 48 (4th ed. 1977)). The theory would hold that any public statement
issued by a corporation would be absorbed by the market and be reflected in that corporation's stock
price. Id.
52. 524 F.2d at 906. Other courts have mistakenly spoken of reliance solely in terms of loss
causation. For example, in Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
the Southern District of New York upheld class certification in a lOb-5 action based on a misleading
omission of a corporation. In failing to differentiate between loss causation and transaction causa-
tion the court stated:
In effect, reliance here means causation. Causation is an essential element of all tort cases,
and claims under lOb-5 should be no exception. Where a buyer or seller of securities alters
his decisionmaking because of a material falsehood imparted to him, this reliance provides
the causal link between the defendants' wrongful act, and the loss suffered by the plaintiff.
Id. at 538.
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plaintiff's subsequent transaction, but also that the defendant's actions caused
the plaintiff's actual loss. The issue of transaction causation should be ad-
dressed separately from the issue of loss causation. The former is a question of
reliance, which can be supplied by the fraud-on-the-market theory, while the
latter is a completely different question concerning proof of damages.5 3
In a lOb-5 action based on a material misstatement the plaintiff can satisfy
his burden of proving transaction causation with proof that "the violations in
question caused the [plaintiff] to engage in the transaction in question."'54 As
shown in Peil, courts have allowed plaintiffs to satisfy their burden of proving
transaction causation by relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory to presump-
tively establish transaction causation.
Wholly separate from the issue of transaction causation, the plaintiff must
also satisfy his burden of proving "that the misrepresentations or omissions
caused the economic harm." '55 The fraud-on-the-market theory should not be
extended to provide a rebuttable presumption of loss causation. As the Harris
court noted, "In securities fraud cases, damages are determined in accordance
with the extent to which a plaintiff is actually damaged as a result of the defend-
ant's fraudulent conduct."' 56 Proof of reliance does not establish proof of dam-
ages, as a plaintiff must independently show that the statement was not only
integrated into the market and he indirectly relied upon it, but also that the
statement affected the market price adversely. 57
The Court's opinion in Basic is open to the interpretation that plaintiffs can
rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to satisfy their burden of proving loss
causation. The potential confusion in the Court's opinion is brought out in its
discussion of ways to rebut the presumption of reliance.58 The Court stated,
"Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff ... will be sufficient to rebut
the presumption." 59 In effect, the Court is saying that if the defendant can
prove that the corporate misstatements did not directly affect the price of the
stock, regardless of whether the statements were actually integrated into the
market, then the defendant can successfully rebut the presumption of reliance.
If, however, the defendant proves that the misstatements did not adversely effect
the price at the time of the plaintiff's transaction, the defendant has negated loss
53. See Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1986) (in addition to reliance,
or transactional causation, the plaintiffs were required to prove loss causation); Hatrock v. Edward
V. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984) ("the plaintiff must prove both transaction causa-
tion, that the violations in question cause the plaintiff to engage in the transaction, and loss causa-
tion, that the misrepresentations or omissions caused the harm").
54. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975).
55. Id. at 380.
56. Harris, 787 F.2d at 367.
57. See cases cited supra note 53. For further discussion of the necessity of distinguishing be-
tween loss causation and transaction causation in cases involving nondisclosure of material informa-
tion, see T. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.6 (2d ed., to be published 1990) (copy on file at
University of North Carolina Law Library).
58. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988).
59. Id.
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causation, not transaction causation. The Court's holding stands for the propo-
sition that the defendant can rebut the presumption of reliance (which estab-
lishes only transaction causation) by negating loss causation. The inescapable
conclusion to be drawn from the Court's statement is that the plaintiff can rely
on the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish loss causation.
The Court describes a situation in which a defendant's wrongful denial of
the existence of merger negotiations was integrated into the market price. "[I]f
... news of the merger discussions credibly entered the market and dissipated
the effects of the misstatements, those who traded Basic shares after the correc-
tive statements would have no direct or indirect connection with the fraud."' 60
The Court presents the above situation as an example of a way to rebut the
presumption of reliance. As noted earlier, the defendant's proof that the market
price was unaffected by the misstatements due to other information does not
affect the question of reliance, but instead is concerned with the issue of loss
causation. The potential confusion arises out of the Court's failure to choose its
terms with precision. In proving that the misstatements did not affect the mar-
ket price at the time of plaintiff's transaction, the defendant has defeated the
plaintiff's claim rather than rebutted the plaintiff's proof of reliance. The de-
fendant alternatively could have defeated plaintiff's claim by showing that the
market makers never believed the misstatements and accordingly the informa-
tion never was infused into the market. 6 1
In either case, the defendant would have prevailed. The critical distinction
lies in the reasons for the defendant's success. When the defendant puts forth
evidence that the market never picked up the misstatements, the plaintiff cannot
rely on the integrity of the market to prove transaction causation because the
market had no connection with the defendant's fraud. When the defendant
proves that other information dissipated the effects of the misstatements after
the misstatements had been infused into the market, the plaintiff can still rely on
the integrity of the market to prove transaction causation, but he cannot prove
monetary damage.
The Court needs to limit its holding in a way that differentiates between
loss causation and transaction causation. Although the Court does not say that
a plaintiff can satisfy his burden of proving loss causation solely by relying on
the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Court's holding that a plaintiff can rebut
transaction causation by proving the absence of loss causation could lead to con-
fusion. As written, the Court's holding can be interpreted to mean that the pre-
sumption of reliance, if not rebutted, presumptively establishes that defendant's
statements caused the plaintiff's loss. The burden would then be on the defend-
60. Id.
61. The Court discusses this situation, in which market makers did not factor the misstate-
ments into the stock's price, and concluded that in such a case, "the basis for finding that the fraud
had been transmitted through market price would be gone." Id. at 992. The defendant would have
rebutted the presumption of reliance with proof that there was no transaction causation. If the
misstatements were never infused into the market, then the plaintiff's claim that he relied upon the
statement indirectly through reliance on the integrity of the market would be defeated. The court
would not have to reach the issue of loss causation unless the plaintiff could somehow prove direct
reliance.
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ant to rebut that presumption. This interpretion is contradictory to the purpose
behind the fraud-on-the-market theory. The theory arose out of courts' desire to
aid shareholders who could not prove that they directly relied upon a material
misstatement issued by a corporation in the impersonal marketplace. 62 In order
to facilitate shareholder recovery and deter future misstatements, courts allowed
plaintiffs who could not prove direct reliance on the misstatements to satisfy the
reliance requirement by using a presumption that they relied on the integrity of
the market price.63 The basis for this presumption is that the corporate mis-
statement was issued into an efficient market, which then reflected the fraudu-
lent statement in the price of that corporation's stock. 64 This reliance was the
inducement for the plaintiff either to purchase or sell the stock and, therefore,
established transaction causation. 65
The Court's confusion in Basic does not render the decision incorrect. The
Court was ruling on the specific question of whether the fraud-on-the-market
theory could be used to establish a rebuttable presumption of reliance for all
shareholders in order to effectuate class certification. 66 The Court even stated
that the decision "is not to be interpreted as addressing the proper measure of
damages." 67
The Court should properly interpret its ruling in Basic to limit the use of
the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish only transaction causation. The case
will arise in which the plaintiff will base his claim for damages on the difference
in market price when the misrepresentation was made and when he bought or
sold stock. When such a case does arise, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to prove
his actual loss simply by showing the differences in the price, proving the mate-
rial misstatement and then relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory to estab-
lish the requisite causation between the misstatement and the stock's price
change. Instead, a plaintiff must have the burden of proving that the misstate-
ments-as opposed to decline in the overall market or other corporate or eco-
nomic developments-actually caused the stock to change a specified amount.
Although the efficient-market theory is one element of such proof, a plaintiff
should have to prove his loss with specific economic data. Otherwise, as Justice
White argued in his dissent, a plaintiff could recover by showing "little more
62. See Black, supra note 29, at 440 & n.21.
63. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986); Harris v. Union Elcc. Co., 787
F.2d 355, 367 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 747 (1 1th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar,
647 F.2d 462, 471 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Blackic v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
64. See supra note 51.
65. Harris, 787 F.2d at 366.
66. Id. at 989. The Court's acceptance of the rebuttable presumption of reliance is in accord
with all the federal circuits that have decided the fraud-on-the-market issue and concluded that
when materially misleading statements have been infused into the securities market, the reliance of
the individual shareholder on the integrity of the market price as an illustration of a stock's true
value can be presumed. See supra cases cited in note 63.
67. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992 n.28.
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than that [he] sold stock at a lower price than what might have been." '68
GREGORY C. AVIOLI
68. Id. at 996 (White, J., dissenting).
